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INTRODUCTION 
Partisanship undermines judicial nominations to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit. With three of eleven judgeships vacant during Barack 
Obama’s first term, he was the only President in a half century not to appoint a jurist 
to the nation’s second-most important court. Confirming accomplished nominees, 
thus, became imperative for the circuit’s prompt, economical, and fair case 
disposition. In 2013, Obama submitted excellent candidates. Patricia Millett had 
argued thirty-two Supreme Court appeals;1 Cornelia Pillard successfully litigated 
numerous path-breaking matters;2 and Robert Wilkins had served on the D.C. 
District bench for three years.3 The purportedly shrinking tribunal caseload4 and 
concerns about Pillard’s supposed ideological perspectives spurred Republicans to 
filibuster each nominee,5 initiatives which multiple cloture petitions did not 
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 1. Presidential Statement on Senate Confirmation of Patricia A. Millett as a Judge on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1 (Dec. 10, 2013). 
 2. See Presidential Statement on Senate Confirmation of Cornelia T.L. “Nina” Pillard as 
a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 2013 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Dec. 12, 2013). 
 3. 159 CONG. REC. S8088 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2013) (statement of Sen. Cardin). 
 4. See id. at S8089 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (identifying the D.C. Circuit as “a court 
that needs no more judges”).  
 5. See Al Kamen, Senate Committee Approves Obama Nominee for D.C. Circuit, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 20, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2013/09/20/senate
-committee-approves-obama-nominee-for-d-c-circuit/ [http://perma.cc/S59L-8M9B]; Todd 
Ruger, Nina Pillard Nomination for D.C. Circuit Advances, BLT: BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (Sept. 
19, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/09/nina-pillard-nomination
-for-dc-circuit-advances.html [http://perma.cc/END2-SX43].  
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surmount.6 Because the President’s able, mainstream recommendations deserve 
thorough, expeditious Senate review with positive or negative final votes, Democrats 
cautiously revised filibuster strictures to allow upper-chamber ballots,7 and the 
individuals captured approval.8  
This controversy enhances appreciation of the D.C. Circuit, particularly selection 
practice, while simultaneously illuminating and exacerbating the critically 
deteriorated Republican and Democratic relations that plague Senate consideration 
of additional court nominees as the 114th Congress proceeds. Accordingly, the 
dispute merits scrutiny. This Article’s initial section posits a D.C. Circuit snapshot. 
Part II surveys all three prospects’ confirmations. Part III assesses consequences of, 
and extracts lessons from, the specific processes recounted. Part IV proffers 
suggestions for improvement. 
I. A SKETCH OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
The court’s history9 warrants brief treatment. Some aspects differentiate D.C. 
Circuit appointments from appointments to other regional circuits. The court hears 
challenges to agency choices which profoundly affect millions and cost billions10 yet 
has narrower jurisdiction,11 deciding fewer “social policy” questions, such as issues 
regarding capital punishment, sexual-orientation discrimination, and same-sex 
marriage, which can make nominees appear controversial.12 Presidents have also 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. 159 CONG. REC. S8092 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2013) (Wilkins); 159 CONG. REC. S7949 
(daily ed. Nov. 12, 2013) (Pillard); 159 CONG. REC. S7706 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 2013) (Millett).  
 7. See 159 CONG. REC. S8418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013); Paul Kane, Senate Eliminates 
Filibusters on Most Nominees, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2013, at A1. 
 8. 160 CONG. REC. S283 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2014) (Wilkins); 159 CONG. REC. S8667 
(daily ed. Dec. 11, 2013) (Pillard); 159 CONG. REC. S8584 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2013) (Millett). 
 9. The background has been chronicled elsewhere. See generally CHRISTOPHER P. 
BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT (1999); Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit 
as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 159 (1993).  
 10. See Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Part 1, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 Hearings] (statement of Sen. 
Chuck Grassley, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that the Court “hears cases 
affecting all Americans, [and] is frequently the last stop for cases involving Federal statutes 
and regulations”). It also treats separation of powers cases. E.g., Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 
F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 11. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41–44 (2012) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. 
No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869); D.C. CODE §§ 11-101, -301 (LexisNexis 2001) (originally enacted 
as District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473); 
see also John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 
VA. L. REV. 375, 376–77, 387–89 (2006).  
 12. Circuits have fewer, more critical openings than districts and are courts of last resort 
for ninety-nine percent of cases. Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2233, 2240 (2013). 
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elevated Justices from the tribunal.13 The D.C. Circuit’s small complement 14 meant 
openings were rarely disputed until 1999 when two outstanding aspirants had limited 
review.15 President George W. Bush’s success was mixed.16 He proposed contested 
submissions, who provoked stalling that ended with the “Gang of 14” agreement, 
which permitted filibusters only in “extraordinary circumstances.”17 Democrats 
stymied two accomplished conservative nominees,18 but another very qualified 
lawyer felicitously won confirmation.19 Thus, the court experienced two vacancies 
when Obama captured election. 
II. OBAMA ADMINISTRATION SELECTION 
A. Descriptive Analysis 
Obama has improved appointment procedures,20 constantly seeking assistance 
from both parties.21 He engaged Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the Judiciary 
Committee Chair, who set hearings and votes; Harry Reid (D-NV), the Majority 
Leader, who controlled the floor; and GOP analogues, Chuck Grassley (IA) and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, 
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg were elevated. The D.C. Circuit’s location, unlike the regional 
circuits, lacks senators. This means the President does not need to seek senators’ 
recommendations before nominating, and no senator can block the confirmation process by 
retaining a “blue slip.” These ideas show why Presidents traditionally assume the lead in 
selection. 
 14. In 1977, it had nine judges. See Act of October 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 
1629, 1632 (expanding D.C. Circuit from nine to eleven judges). In 1990, it had twelve, but 
in 2008, workloads and caseloads supported transferring one to the Ninth Circuit. See Court 
Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, 121 Stat. 2534, 2543 (2008).  
 15. They were Elena Kagan and Allen Snyder. See Judicial Vacancy List for December 
1999, U.S. COURTS (Dec. 1, 1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial
-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/1999/12/vacancies/html [http://perma.cc/2H8E-RVX9]. 
 16. See Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski & Sara Schiavoni, Picking 
Judges in a Time of Turmoil: W. Bush’s Judiciary During the 109th Congress, 90 JUDICATURE 
252 (2007) (noting number of judicial vacancies filled during Bush Administration); Tobias, 
supra note 12, at 2235–38 (noting criticism of Bush’s circuit nominations); Jeremy W. Peters, 
Eye on Legacy, Obama Shapes Appeals Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2014, at A1 (noting that 
Obama lagged behind Bush in appointments during his first term). 
 17. They were Janice Rogers Brown and Brett Kavanaugh. Sheldon Goldman, Elliot 
Slotnick & Sara Schiavoni, Obama’s First Term Judiciary: Picking Judges in the Minefield of 
Obstruction, 97 JUDICATURE 7, 18 (2013); Carl Hulse, Bipartisan Group in Senate Averts 
Judge Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at A1. 
 18. The nominees were Miguel Estrada and Peter Keisler. Goldman et al., supra note 17, 
at 29–30. 
 19. The lawyer was Thomas Griffith. Id. at 29; Editorial, Three Nominees, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 17, 2005, at A24. 
 20. Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick & Sara Schiavoni, Obama’s Judiciary at Midterm, 
94 JUDICATURE 262 (2011); Tobias, supra note 12. 
 21. Tobias, supra note 12, at 2240; see Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Chooses 
Hispanic Judge for Supreme Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A1.  
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Mitch McConnell (KY),22 who hold the positions today.23 Despite concerted 
attempts, Republicans nominally cooperated. Although Democrats promptly 
scheduled hearings,24 the minority party held over ballots, for capable possibilities 
whom it approved the next week, for seven days without explaining why.25 
McConnell collaborated little to schedule final votes, and his colleagues placed 
anonymous or unsubstantiated holds on well-qualified consensus nominees; this 
frustrated appointments, demanding cloture.26 The GOP aggressively sought 
plentiful, unnecessary roll call ballots and debate time.27 Upon Obama’s 
inauguration, the D.C. Circuit had two empty judgeships.28 These machinations show 
why he proffered the initial nominee, Caitlin Halligan, at 2010’s conclusion and the 
second, Srikanth Srinivasan, twenty months later.29 The consideration provided both 
aspirants enlarges comprehension of three nominations one year thereafter, although 
the first seems a more instructive roadmap. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. Tobias, supra note 12, at 2242.  
 23. Ashley Parker, Chastened Republicans Beat Democrats at Their Own Ground Game, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2014, at A12; Timothy M. Phelps, Iowa’s Grassley Is First Nonlawyer to 
Head Senate Judiciary Committee, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014, 7:27 PM), http://www.latimes.com
/nation/la-na-grassley-chairman-20141113-story.html [http://perma.cc/QN32-4MA3]. 
 24. Tobias, supra note 12, at 2242; see Maureen Groppe, No Sparks Fly at Hearing, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 30, 2009, at A3 (noting that Republicans boycotted the confirmation 
hearing of Judge David Hamilton because it was “held too quickly”). 
 25. The GOP found most “fine nominees.” Executive Business Meeting, U.S. SENATE 
COMM. ON JUDICIARY (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/executive
-business-meeting-2009-10-15 [http://perma.cc/6BAE-SKPQ]; Executive Business Meeting, 
U.S. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov
/meetings/time-change_executive-business-meeting [http://perma.cc/R54N-E6RT]. 
 26. See 156 CONG. REC. 2046 (2010); 155 CONG. REC. 27,799–800 (2009); see generally 
Ryan J. Owens, Daniel E. Walters, Ryan C. Black & Anthony Madonna, Ideology, 
Qualifications, and Covert Senate Obstruction of Federal Court Nominations, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 347, 368 (discussing holds as an “obstructive tactic”). 
 27. It even sought a roll call ballot and sixty minutes but used only five for able picks like 
Judge Beverly Martin; she won approval 97–0. 156 CONG. REC. 249, 253 (2010); see Doug 
Kendall, The Bench in Purgatory, SLATE (Oct. 26, 2009, 9:34 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/10/the_bench_in_purgatory
.html [http://perma.cc/QMC6-QSVU]. 
 28. Chief Justice Roberts’s elevation and Judge Raymond Randolph’s assumption of 
senior status created the vacancies. See U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
– 110TH CONGRESS (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial
-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2008/12/vacancies/pdf [http://perma.cc/3YUM-KPGX].  
 29. Judges Douglas Ginsburg and David Sentelle later assumed senior status. Judicial 
Vacancy List for March 2013, U.S. COURTS (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges
-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2013/03/vacancies/html 
[http://perma.cc/4UNY-UW4E] (Sentelle); Judicial Vacancy List for November 2011, U.S. 
COURTS (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies
/archive-judicial-vacancies/2011/11/vacancies/html [http://perma.cc/ZQB4-NUEV] (Ginsburg).  
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1. Caitlin Halligan 
When nominating Caitlin Halligan, Obama mainly described her as a 
“nationally-recognized appellate litigator who has practiced extensively before the 
Supreme Court . . . .”30 She worked for preeminent jurists and major law firms,31 
became New York Solicitor General,32 and later directed Weil, Gotshal & Manges’s 
appellate group.33 The panel did not set a 2010 hearing,34 which meant the 
nomination expired.35 Obama renominated Halligan once the 112th Congress 
assembled.36 During a February hearing, GOP members tendered politically charged 
queries.37 Grassley wondered if the “Second Amendment protects [gun] rights;” 
Halligan explained the Court affirmed this, vowing to follow the Court’s precedent.38 
Other Republicans challenged a New York Bar assertion that chief executives lack 
authority to indefinitely detain enemy combatants,39 a view Halligan rejected as 
“clearly incorrect.”40 The senators also explored whether the putative decline of 
appeals eliminated the need to fill the vacancy.41 Democrats urged that cases and 
appeals’ complexity had grown.42 Halligan was reported after limited panel 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Names Two to U.S. Circuit Courts, WHITE 
HOUSE (Sept. 29, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/29/president
-obama-names-two-us-circuit-courts-0 [http://perma.cc/XUV9-FXJH]; see 2011 Hearings, 
supra note 10, at 10–11 (statement of Sen. Chuck Schumer, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
 31. She clerked for D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia Wald and Justice Stephen Breyer and 
worked at New York firms. Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 30. 
 32. Id.; see Linda Greenhouse, Rock Bottom, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Dec. 14, 2011, 
9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/rock-bottom/ [http://perma.cc
/3PTE-AGB7]. 
 33. She returned to public service in 2010 as General Counsel for the New York County 
District Attorney’s Office. Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 30. 
 34. Senators adjourned the day she was named. See H.R. Con. Res. 321, 111th Cong., 156 
CONG. REC. 17,001 (2010); see also Carl Tobias, Filling the Judicial Vacancies in a 
Presidential Election Year, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 985 (2012). 
 35. It expired when Congress left to campaign. See 156 CONG. REC. 23,566 (2010). 
 36. 112th Congress - Judicial Nominations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ARCHIVES, 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/nominations112.htm [http://perma.cc/8K3J-EMU7].  
 37. “Judicial activism,” gun control, and terrorism were some. See 2011 Hearings, supra 
note 10, at 13–24 (questions of Sens. Grassley, Kyl, and Lee, Members, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). “Judicial activism” cannot be objectively identified. See generally KERMIT 
ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS (2006). 
 38. 2011 Hearings, supra note 10, at 14; see also Gail Collins, Op-Ed., Talk of the Town, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2013, at A27 (arguing that Senator McConnell’s filibuster of Halligan 
was “partly a bow to the National Rifle Association”). 
 39. 2011 Hearings, supra note 10, at 12–13.  
 40. Id. at 13. She worked little on the report containing the Bar’s assertion and was acutely 
aware of terrorism’s danger. See id. at 13, 17. 
 41. They minimally pursued this issue. See id. at 4, 19 (statements of Sens. Grassley and 
Lee). 
 42. They grew after the GOP voted to “fill the 10th and 11th seats.” Id. at 9 (statement of 
Sen. Schumer). Halligan was tapped for the tenth.  
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discussion.43 Grassley repeated the claim of activism and concern about dockets.44 
Halligan’s champions refuted the activism construct45 and said filings had 
expanded.46 
In December, when Republicans opposed a floor vote, the majority petitioned for 
cloture, which no GOP senator except Lisa Murkowski (AK) favored.47 The chamber 
aired issues which resembled those presented earlier.48 Grassley contested the 
nominee’s “activist record”49 while finding the court has “too many seats and . . . is 
an underworked circuit.”50 Leahy deemed Halligan excellent51 and he probed 
caseload concerns by emphasizing the appeals’ complexity.52 Senator Richard 
Durbin (D-IL) perceived “no legitimate questions about her competence, ethics, 
temperament, or ideology.”53 The Senate returned Halligan’s nomination to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. A March party-line vote was 10–8. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., RESULTS 
OF EXECUTIVE BUSINESS MEETING 1 (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://www.judiciary
.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ExecutiveBusinessMeetingResults-03-10-2011.pdf [http://perma.cc
/UZB2-7T32].  
 44. He alone spoke in opposition, basing activism on client advocacy and ignoring her 
testimony. See Executive Business Meeting, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY (Mar. 10, 
2011), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/executive-business-meeting-2011-03-10 
[http://perma.cc/995H-42EA] (statement of Sen. Grassley).  
 45. She had an advocacy duty. See id. (statements of Sens. Leahy and Schumer); David 
Ingram, Gun Advocates Step in To Oppose D.C. Circuit Pick, BLT: BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES 
(Mar. 10, 2011, 12:48 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/03/dc-circuit-pick
-becomes-proxy-for-gun-debate.html [http://perma.cc/WXB6-SRHB]. 
 46. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 44.  
 47. 157 CONG REC. S8361 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2011); Charlie Savage & Raymond 
Hernandez, Filibuster by Senate Republicans Blocks Confirmation of Judicial Nominee, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2011, at A16. 
 48. They were raised in the hearing and panel debate. See supra notes 38–41, 44 and 
accompanying text.  
 49. 157 CONG. REC. S8350 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2011); see Dahlia Lithwick, Punch and 
Judge Judy: Senate Republicans Spend a Long Day Protecting the Courts in Order To Trash 
Them, SLATE (Dec. 6, 2011, 7:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics
/jurisprudence/2011/12/caitlin_halligan_filibuster_senate_republicans_spend_a_day
_protecting_the_courts_just_to_trash_them.html [http://perma.cc/X8NL-WH5E] (describing 
the Republican vote to deny cloture). 
 50. 157 CONG. REC. S8351 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2011). Grassley ignored complexity, saying 
U.S. Courts Administrative Office (AO) data show cases “decreased markedly.” Id. 
McConnell conflated advocacy and activism, decrying Halligan’s briefs. Id. at S8346–47. 
 51. Leahy refuted criticisms of Halligan on the Second Amendment, affirmative action, 
enemy combatants, and federalism by arguing Halligan was advocating for clients, analogizing 
her experience to that of Chief Justice Roberts, who supported zealous client advocacy. Id. at 
S8353–56 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2011); id. at S8169–74 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 2011). 
 52. Congress created an eleven-judge court; AO data showed a fourth of seats open and 
“caseload per active judge [rose] one third since 2005;” and the GOP approved four Bush 
picks, but Obama confirmed none. Id. at S8172–73 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 2011). 
 53. Id. at S8348 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2011). She was mainstream, not overly conservative or 
liberal, while concerns about political balance and payback for delaying GOP nominees 
explained the cloture vote. See generally Owens et al., supra note 26, at 351 (noting the role 
of ideology in senators’ use of blue slips). 
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President eleven days later.54 In mid-2012, Obama again proposed her,55 but the 
nomination languished.56 On January 4, 2013, he renominated Halligan.57 She won 
February panel approval without discussion.58 Republicans eschewed a final ballot, 
so Democrats pursued cloture,59 which received one GOP senator’s vote, when 
Grassley and McConnell insistently expressed concerns over filings and what they 
viewed as Halligan’s consistently predictable activism.60 Democrats countered that 
she was fine;61 a number addressed criticisms of Halligan’s purported activism, 
strong client representation and ideology,62 and plummeting D.C. Circuit cases.63 
Obama decried the filibuster, lauding Halligan’s “ethical ideals”;64 explained she “is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. 157 CONG. REC. S8769, D1384 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011).  
 55. See Judicial Vacancy List for July 2012, U.S. COURTS (July 1, 2012), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2012
/07/vacancies/html [http://perma.cc/86RD-ZY4T]; see also Charlie Savage, Obama 
Nominates Two to Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (June 11, 2012, 5:00 PM), 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/obama-nominates-two-to-appeals-court/ 
[http://perma.cc/8CDG-7BJB].  
 56. The nomination expired when Congress adjourned. See 159 CONG. REC. S16, S18 
(daily ed. Jan. 3, 2013).  
 57. Judicial Vacancy List for February 2013, U.S. COURTS (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/
2013/02/vacancies/html [http://perma.cc/QHT2-XXKW]. Delay frustrated Democrats who 
pondered filibuster reform in early 2013 but delayed major change due to GOP promises of 
greater cooperation. See 159 CONG. REC. S8418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013); 159 CONG. REC. 
S5625–61 (daily ed. July 11, 2013); 159 CONG. REC. S247–71 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2013); infra 
note 97. 
 58. See Executive Business Meeting, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/executive-business-meeting-2013-02-14 
[http://perma.cc/3X7V-WVM9]. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) passed. Id. 
 59. 159 CONG. REC. S1146 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2013) (cloture vote). Estrada’s invocation 
evoked payback. See 159 CONG. REC. S1139–40 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2013); supra note 18 and 
accompanying text.  
 60. See 159 CONG. REC. S1139 (daily ed. Mar 6, 2013) (statement of Sen. McConnell); 
159 CONG. REC. at S1141 (statement of Sen. Grassley); 159 CONG. REC. S1143 (statement of 
Sen. McCain) (“Ms. Halligan’s demonstrated record of judicial activism . . . . meets 
‘extraordinary circumstances . . . .’”); Paul Kane, Court Pick Blocked by GOP Filibuster, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2013, at A3.  
 61. They cited her avid client advocacy, invoking Chief Justice Roberts again. 159 CONG. 
REC. S1098–99, S1105–06 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2013) (statements of Sens. Durbin and Leahy); 
see supra note 51. 
 62. Democrats stated that accusations of activism lack content and that zealous advocacy 
and putative ideology are not extraordinary circumstances that would justify a filibuster; 
neither honors the accord’s terms or spirit or disaggregates counsel, personal, and client views. 
159 CONG. REC. S1098, S1105, S1111, S1114–15 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2013) (statements of Sens. 
Durbin, Leahy, Cardin, Coons, and Schumer). 
 63. Rather than having a plummeting number of cases, the D.C. Circuit actually has a 
growing number of cases, many of which are complex. See id. at S1096, S1106, S1114 
(statements of Sens. Reid, Leahy, and Schumer). Use of diverse times and measures, such as 
types of cases or judges, explains some disparities. Yet, certain ideas, namely case numbers, 
conflict. Id. at S1114 (statements of Sens. Coons and Schumer); see infra note 159.  
 64. Presidential Statement on Senate Action To Block the Nomination of Caitlin J. 
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well within the mainstream”;65 and urged that a notable Republican Gang of 14 
member conceded “only an ethics or qualification issue—not ideology—would” 
substantiate a filibuster.66 Halligan promptly withdrew.67 
The discourse’s rhetorical quality complicates exact identification of reasons for 
the loss, which essentially means that unstated views were significant.68 
Extrapolating from Halligan’s zealous client advocacy that she could prove to be an 
activist judge, the GOP apparently opposed cloture not because Halligan was 
conclusively moderate or extreme but because it disagreed with her projected 
jurisprudence.69 Repeatedly denying Halligan floor votes also revealed the sustained 
unproductive dynamic that now riddles the “confirmation wars.”70 In any event, the 
parties seemed most concerned about ideological balance.71 Halligan’s defeat 
effectively informs understanding of the latest nominees, especially Pillard, and the 
role that ideology can assume. But Halligan’s protracted process markedly contrasts 
with the second nominee’s comparatively expeditious confirmation process.  
2. Srikanth Srinivasan 
On June 11, 2012, Obama nominated Srikanth Srinivasan,72 the Principal Deputy 
U.S. Solicitor General, proclaiming Srinivasan was recognized as a leading Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
Halligan To Be a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Mar. 6, 2013).  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.; see 159 CONG. REC. S8076 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2013) (identifying Gang member 
as Sen. Lindsey Graham). 
 67. Letter from Caitlin J. Halligan to President Barack Obama (Mar. 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/files/2013/03/CJH-letter-3_22_2013.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/AG7N-VFYV].  
 68. Leahy said both parties engaged in delay, suggesting payback. 159 CONG. REC. S2914 
(daily ed. Apr. 24, 2013); 158 CONG. REC. S20 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2012); see also Linda 
Greenhouse, Of Judges and Judging, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Apr. 17, 2013, 9:00 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/of-judges-and-judging/ [http://perma.cc/BA49
-PL54] (referring to the D.C. Circuit as a “political football” while addressing Senator 
Grassley’s bill to eliminate three judgeships to achieve political balance). 
 69. The GOP argued that Democrats similarly treated Bush nominees. 159 CONG. REC. 
S1140–42 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2013) (statements of Sens. McConnell and Grassley). But see 
159 CONG. REC. at S2644 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2013) (statement of Sen. Leahy).  
 70. The GOP has greater responsibility because its lack of cooperation meant that U.S. 
vacancies were near ten percent for an unprecedented half decade. See DENISE A. CARDMAN, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, ARTICLE III VACANCIES: STATISTICS BY THE MONTH 2009-PRESENT (last 
updated Oct. 1, 2015), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/uncategorized/GAO/vacanciesbymonth.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/FVL4-C7LF] 
(near ten percent vacancy rate); see also Goldman et al., supra note 17, at 13 (noting White 
House Senior Counsel Christopher Kang’s view that “‘the vacancy rate has never been this 
high for so long’”).  
 71. Some senators intimated the GOP would oppose any nominee to keep balance. 159 
CONG. REC. at S1114–15, S1139 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2013) (statements of Sens. Schumer and 
Durbin); see also Editorial, Courts Without Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2013, at SR10. 
 72. Srinivasan was nominated when Halligan was renominated. See Savage, supra note 
55. 
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advocate73 who had chaired the O’Melveny & Myers appellate section.74 That 
presidential election year, he was not canvassed.75 In January, Obama renominated 
Srinivasan.76 During the April hearing, which proceeded smoothly, Republicans 
extolled his capabilities and posed few queries.77 Grassley declared he intended to 
sponsor the Court Efficiency Act of 2013, which would place two D.C. Circuit 
judgeships in other appeals courts and eliminate a third.78 On May 16, the panel 
unanimously reported Srinivasan and discussed him only in positive ways, yet GOP 
senators raised a “court packing” allegation while voicing concern about caseloads, 
even as Democrats countered the notions.79 Because McConnell would not agree to 
a Senate ballot, the majority petitioned for cloture80 and Srinivasan readily captured 
appointment with practically no debate,81 but Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) reiterated 
the court-packing accusation.82  
In short, President Obama carefully nominated Halligan, yet the GOP apparently 
consulted little objective evidence in deciding to make her wait longer than over 350 
remaining nominees on a final vote that never materialized, while Srinivasan did 
attain rather prompt confirmation. The strikingly disparate review of these two 
nominees defies explanation, as both had represented controversial perspectives and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Nominates Two To Serve on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, WHITE HOUSE (June 11, 2012), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/11/president-obama-nominates-two
-serve-us-court-appeals-district-columbia-c [http://perma.cc/2JHP-7STN]. Srinivasan had 
argued twenty Supreme Court cases. Id. 
 74. Id. The pick clerked for Fourth Circuit Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson and Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor. Id. 
 75. See supra note 56 (nomination expired with presidential election year adjournment). 
 76. See supra note 57; see also Goldman et al., supra note 17, at 30. 
 77. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, Part 2, 113th Cong. 91–101 (2013) [hereinafter Srinivasan Hearing] 
(statements of Sens. Hatch, Lee, and Cruz, Members, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see Jeremy 
W. Peters, Easy Hearing for Obama’s Choice for Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2013, at A14. 
 78. Srinivasan Hearing, supra note 77, at 8 (statement of Sen. Grassley); S. 699, 113th 
Cong. (2013); see also Jeremy W. Peters, Republican Effort to Unpack the Court, N.Y. TIMES: 
THE CAUCUS (Apr. 11, 2013, 4:04 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com
/2013/04/11/republican-effort-to-unpack-the-court/ [http://perma.cc/J5LF-J9W3]. Grassley’s 
bill conflicts with Judicial Conference judgeship recommendations based on conservative 
caseload and workload estimates in empirical data. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 18–19 
(Mar. 12, 2013) (recommending addition of one judge for the Sixth Circuit and four judges 
for the Ninth Circuit); see also Fed. Judgeship Act of 2013, S.1385, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(proposing addition of judgeships per the Judicial Conference’s recommendations). 
 79. Executive Business Meeting, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY (May 16, 2013), 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/continuation-executive-business-meeting-2013-05
-16 [http://perma.cc/PSV4-AKYS] (statements of Sens. Grassley, Leahy and Lee). President 
Franklin Roosevelt employed court packing in the 1930s. JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER 
(2010). 
 80. 159 CONG. REC. S3698 (daily ed. May 21, 2013).  
 81. Id. at S3815 (daily ed. May 23, 2013) (97–0 approval).  
 82. See id. at S3812 (statement of Sen. Lee). 
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litigants.83 Twice denying a superb mainstream nominee’s floor ballot presaged 
fraught consideration which the recent aspirants directly confronted. 
3. The Three Recent Nominees 
When introducing all three of the most recent nominees, Obama claimed they 
earned the best ABA rating and that a third of court slots were vacant,84 meaning it 
needed more judges;85 was delighted that Republicans “chose not to play politics” by 
delaying Srinivasan, as with Halligan; and hoped to capitalize on this progress.86 
Obama refuted GOP assertions that the submissions were an attempt at court 
packing: “We’re not adding seats here. We’re trying to fill seats that are already 
existing.”87  
a. Patricia Millett 
In selecting Patricia Millett, Obama depicted the nominee as one of the country’s 
finest appellate counsel, who until recently had argued “the most Supreme Court” 
appeals by a woman,88 praising her nonpartisan work in the Solicitor General’s 
Office.89 During a July hearing, many GOP legislators found the choice exceptional, 
asking virtually no probing queries.90 However, a few questioned whether the court 
required jurists, and Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) alleged the circuit “has been a 
battleground on both sides for the politicization of judicial nominations” and even 
contended Obama and senior lawmakers were court packing because they disliked 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. The views and clients Halligan had represented may appear comparatively liberal and 
more easily caricatured than Srinivasan’s. The GOP might also have differentiated the New 
York and U.S. Solicitors General, but Srinivasan did work on United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and other controversial matters. 
 84. Remarks on the Nominations of Patricia A. Millet, Cornelia T.L. “Nina” Pillard, and 
Robert L. Wilkins To Be Judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 1–2 (June 4, 2013) [hereinafter Remarks].  
 85. See id.; Jeffrey Toobin, The Obama Brief, NEW YORKER, Oct. 27, 2014, at 24.  
 86. Remarks, supra note 84, at 2. But see Gail Collins, Op-Ed., The Public Needs a Nap, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, at A35 (suggesting that GOP was playing politics with three D.C. 
Circuit nominees). 
 87. Remarks, supra note 84, at 3 (noting that the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
which is chaired by Chief Justice Roberts, “told the Senate that the current workload before 
the DC Circuit requires 11 judges”); see supra text accompanying note 79. 
 88. Remarks, supra note 84; Sarah Wheaton and Kitty Bennett, Obama’s Appeals Court 
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (June 4, 2013, 12:57 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs
.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/obamas-appeals-court-nominees/ [http://perma.cc/GG4Y-3VPJ]. 
 89. She served in the Office for Democratic and Republican Presidents. Remarks, supra 
note 84, at 2. 
 90. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 4, 113th Cong. 90–92 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 Hearings] 
(statement of Sen. Michael S. Lee, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see also John Gramlich, 
Republicans Unveil Arguments Against Obama’s D.C. Circuit Picks, CQ (July 10, 2013, 4:49 
PM), http://www.cq.com/doc/news-4312190?0&search=YXJ9xqRG [http://perma.cc/68L9
-NSUE]. 
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the “outcomes of judges applying the law fairly.”91 Republicans who spoke on Millett 
in the next month’s panel discussion candidly acknowledged her stunning 
qualifications yet enunciated concern about the necessity for the positions.92 
Democrats concurred as to her competence but asserted the court merited the jurists 
and reminded the GOP that it had quickly confirmed the ninth, tenth, and eleventh 
judges in Bush’s tenure.93 Following much spirited debate,94 the nominee achieved a 
10–8 party-line vote.95 The minority refused a final ballot, so Democrats pursued 
October cloture which failed.96 However, they adopted the “nuclear option,” so a 
majority vote could rapidly terminate filibusters,97 and a November cloture petition 
succeeded98 before her approval three weeks later.99 
b. Cornelia Pillard 
When Obama tapped Cornelia Pillard, he insisted she evinced “an unshakeable 
commitment to the public good” by defending the Family and Medical Leave Act’s 
constitutionality and successfully arguing for the opening of the Virginia Military 
Institute to female students.100 Obama claimed her appointment would continue the 
“tradition” of esteemed academics becoming D.C. Circuit jurists “from Antonin 
Scalia to Ruth Bader Ginsburg.”101 In the July hearing, GOP legislators pressed 
concerns about filings.102 Several sharply criticized Pillard’s nuanced beliefs and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. 2013 Hearings, supra note 90, at 95. He said able Bush nominees were blocked and 
his views were “irrespective of [her] very fine professional qualifications.” Id.at 96; see also 
Richard Wolf, Republicans Signal a Fight over Obama’s Court Nominees, USA TODAY (July 
10, 2013, 1:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/07/10/senate
-judiciary-patricia-millett-republicans-democrats-appeals-judges-supreme-court/2505643/ [http:
//perma.cc/QBK5-2FRN]. 
 92. Executive Business Meeting, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/executive-business-meeting-2013-08-01 [http://perma.cc
/7WFA-PD9J]. Cruz and Lee aired court packing again. Id.  
 93. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 92 (statements of Sens. Leahy and Schumer).  
 94. It mainly treated court seats. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 92; see supra 
text accompanying notes 92–93. 
 95. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 113TH CONG., RESULTS OF EXECUTIVE BUSINESS 
MEETING 1 (Aug. 1, 2013), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc
/ExecutiveBusinessMeetingResults-08-1-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/4HX4-RE9F]; see also 
Brent Kendall, Senate Panel Splits on Judge Nominee, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Aug. 1, 
2013, 2:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/08/01/senate-panel-splits-on-judge
-nominee/ [http://perma.cc/9CPD-QP5J]. 
 96. 159 CONG. REC. S7708 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 2013). Debate stressed the need for judges. 
See id. 
 97. 159 CONG. REC. S8418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013) (rule change); Paul Kane, Senate 
Eliminates Filibusters on Most Nominees, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2013, at A1. 
 98. 159 CONG. REC. S8418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013).  
 99. 159 CONG. REC. S8584 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2013).  
 100. Remarks, supra note 84, at 2. She served as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General, in 
the Solicitor General’s Office, and at the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Grassley read circuit judges’ unsigned views that opposed filling the three vacancies. 
2013 Hearings, supra note 90, at 357–58. Senator Blumenthal (D-CT) raised views of GOP 
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scholarship on women’s equality, abortion, contraception, and religious freedom.103 
Cruz strongly protested by disdainfully repeating the court-packing accusation and 
claiming that Pillard’s “academic writings . . . suggest that [her] views may well be 
considerably out of the mainstream.”104 The nominee cogently urged that a scholar’s 
endeavor is frequently provocative, and she clearly appreciated the difference 
between circuit service and lawyering.105 Yet, certain observers apparently 
misunderstood or contorted Pillard’s writing and testimony, deeming her a judicial 
activist or a “radical feminist.”106 Democrats reiterated that every slot was important 
and that the GOP peremptorily confirmed Bush aspirants.107 On September 19, the 
committee held discussion and cast ballots. Republican attendees evidenced concerns 
about the court vacancies and criticized Pillard’s ideas espoused in the hearing and 
scholarship, finding the choice activist or lacking moderation; Democrats contended 
the nominee was mainstream and the circuit necessarily merited the judges.108 After 
relatively laconic discussion, Pillard captured 10–8 approval.109 When the GOP 
                                                                                                                 
 
D.C. Circuit appointees, such as Chief Justice Roberts, that judges are needed. Id. at 358. 
 103. See id. at 432–34, 436–38, 440–42 (statements of Sens. Grassley, Lee, and Cruz). 
 104. Id. at 440–41. Others agreed on court packing. Id. at 9–12, 95–96, 436, 440 
(statements of Sens. Grassley, Cruz and Lee); see Todd Ruger, D.C. Circuit Nominee Under 
Fire on Capitol Hill, BLT: BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (July 24, 2013, 1:46 PM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/07/dc-circuit-nominee-under-fire-on-capitol-hill.html 
[http://perma.cc/4FAN-2BUB].  
 105. 2013 Hearings, supra note 90, at 444. She pledged to follow precedent, if confirmed. 
Id. at 445; see Richard Wolf, Obama Judicial Nominee Questioned on Abortion, Religion, 
USA TODAY (July 24, 2013, 6:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/politics/2013/07/24/judicial-nominations-obama-republicans-abortion-religion/2583953/ 
[http://perma.cc/5F7E-HDTJ]. 
 106. Dahlia Lithwick, Cry of the Republican Male Senator, SLATE (July 23, 2013, 4:03 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/07/nina_pillard_s_senate_judiciary
_committee_hearing_republican_senators_try.html [http://perma.cc/MP2G-3GM3]; see Ed 
Whelan, D.C. Circuit Nominee Pillard’s False and Deceptive Testimony—Part 1, NAT’L REV. 
(Sept. 4, 2013, 9:21 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/357556/dc-circuit
-nominee-pillards-false-and-deceptive-testimony-part-1-ed-whelan [http://perma.cc/QV6P
-8RYX]; Ed Whelan, D.C. Circuit Nominee Pillard’s False and Deceptive Testimony—Part 2, 
NAT’L REV. (Sept. 5, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/357684/dc
-circuit-nominee-pillards-false-and-deceptive-testimony-part-2-ed-whelan [http://perma.cc/N3ZD
-73N3]. 
 107. 2013 Hearings, supra note 90, at 352, 438–39 (statements of Sens. Leahy, 
Whitehouse, and Klobuchar). 
 108. Executive Business Meeting, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/updated-executive-business-meeting-2013-09-19 
[http://perma.cc/6E2V-N5N7] (statements of Sens. Feinstein, Grassley, Hatch and Leahy); see 
Al Kamen, Senate Committee Approves Obama Nominee for D.C. Circuit, WASH. POST, Sept. 
20, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2013/09/20/senate-committee
-approves-obama-nominee-for-d-c-circuit/ [http://perma.cc/NR4N-DBYA]. 
 109. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 113TH CONG., RESULTS OF EXECUTIVE BUSINESS 
MEETING 1 (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc
/ExecutiveBusinessMeetingResults-09-19-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/PCK5-6LQ4]. Ideology 
is not an extraordinary circumstance. See supra text accompanying note 66; infra note 139.  
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resisted a yes or no vote, the majority sought November cloture, which the minority 
denied,110 but the rule amendment crucially promoted her December appointment.111 
c. Robert Wilkins 
In tendering Robert Wilkins, Obama declared this was his second request that the 
jurist undertake public service, because Obama had earlier proffered the nominee for 
the “DC District Court and the Senate confirmed him without opposition.”112 Before 
Wilkins’s recent service “with distinction as a Federal judge,” he was a respected 
partner in the Venable law firm.113 At the September 11 hearing, Grassley conceded 
there was mounting disagreement over the necessity to add judges to the court, 
grilling Wilkins on multiple controversial questions regarding Pillard’s views, and 
Lee strenuously probed interpretive theories of the judge, who correctly deflected or 
responsively answered the queries.114 Democrats kept arguing the tribunal requires 
all of its vacancies filled.115 In October, the committee discussed the nominee and 
voted. Senators Grassley and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) repeated concerns about filling 
openings; the majority claimed again the D.C. Circuit had a distinctive, prolonged 
need for the judges and Republicans had constantly supported more jurists across the 
Bush years.116 Following terse debate, the panel reported Wilkins 10–8.117 The GOP 
would not concur on a floor ballot, and Democrats introduced a cloture motion that 
November which the minority rejected,118 although the filibuster change finally 
allowed his confirmation in January.119 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. Debate focused on ideology and the judgeships required. 159 CONG. REC. S7949 
(daily ed. Nov. 12, 2013); Jeremy W. Peters, Republicans Again Reject Obama Pick for 
Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2013, at A16.  
 111. 159 CONG. REC. S8667 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2013) (confirmation); see supra note 97 
and accompanying text (rule change). 
 112. Remarks, supra note 84, at 2; see Wheaton & Bennett, supra note 88.  
 113. Remarks, supra note 84, at 2. He also had been a superb public defender. Id. 
 114. See 2013 Hearings, supra note 90, at 945–50. On Pillard’s views and interpretation, 
Wilkins pledged to follow precedent. Id. at 945–47. 
 115. Id. at 1239–40 (statement of Sen. Leahy); see Todd Ruger, Wilkins Breezes Through 
D.C. Circuit Confirmation Hearing, BLT: BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 11, 2013, 1:15 PM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/09/wilkins-breezes-through-dc-circuit-confirmation
-hearing.html [http://perma.cc/92YC-XE8U].  
 116. Executive Business Meeting, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/updated-executive-business-meeting-2013-10-31 
[http://perma.cc/ML3U-MZ4A] (statements of Sens. Grassley, Hatch and Leahy). 
 117. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 113TH CONG., RESULTS OF EXECUTIVE BUSINESS 
MEETING 1 (Oct. 31, 2013), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc
/ExecutiveBusinessMeetingResults-10-31-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/AR96-S92X]. Discussion 
emphasized judgeships and minimally involved Wilkins’s qualifications. Executive Business 
Meeting, supra note 116. 
 118. Debates again stressed the need for judges; only Susan Collins (R-ME) and 
Murkowski voted yes. 159 CONG. REC. S8092 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2013); Jeremy W. Peters, 
Obama Nominee Is Third in a Row Blocked by G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, at A1.  
 119. 160 CONG. REC. S283 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2014) (approval); see supra note 97 
(filibuster change).  
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B. Critical Analysis 
Obama’s efforts have supplied benefits, placing accomplished, diverse jurists in 
lengthy vacancies. Consultation with Republicans facilitated specific nominees’ 
approval.120 Proposing judges, like Wilkins, enables confirmees to invoke 
experience, so they effectively address large caseloads.121 Increased ethnic and 
gender diversity improves comprehension and resolution of core matters, namely 
abortion, criminal law, and discrimination, which jurists hear.122 People of color and 
women correspondingly lessen ethnic, gender, and similar biases which undercut 
justice.123 Courts that reflect America foster public confidence.124 Obama appointees 
could affect ideological diversity,125 but concepts which few express trouble the 
GOP. Insofar as the judges expand this, Obama, even though he downplays 
ideology,126 might substantiate the increase because Republican predecessors seated 
a number of conservatives, especially at the D.C. Circuit.127  
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 20–23. He ably set priorities, while cooperation 
improved selection.  
 121. Tobias, supra note 12, at 2248. Obama named many judges, who can wait long times 
more easily than attorneys, who have colleagues and clients who may be concerned about their 
departure for the bench.  
 122. See generally RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES (1995) (suggesting 
people of color and women, namely Latino/as, improve comprehension and resolution of core 
matters); SALLY J. KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE (2013) (same, especially as to women); 
FRANK H. WU, YELLOW (2002) (same, especially as to Asian Americans). But see Stephen J. 
Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya Holman & Eric A. Posner, Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 504 (2011) (arguing that empirical analysis fails to demonstrate gender’s effect on 
judicial performance). 
 123. Tobias, supra note 12, at 2247, 2249 n.74. Obama set diversity records. Goldman et 
al., supra note 17, at 18.  
 124. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on 
Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423, 1442 (2008). Diverse judges 
ameliorate Senate GOP nullification of popular will expressed in voting by slowing able 
consensus nominees. See 159 CONG. REC. S7972 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2013) (statement of Sen. 
Warren); 159 CONG. REC. S2914 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 125. Insofar as judges favor a “living Constitution,” they may enhance ideological balance. 
See David Fontana, Liberals Can Wear Robes: What a Recent Confirmation Tells Us, 
HUFFPOST POLITICS (Aug. 11, 2014, 5:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david
-fontana/liberals-can-wear-robes-w_b_5669697.html [http://perma.cc/2LLT-Q8G2]. But see 
Terry Eastland, Obama’s Makeover of the Judiciary, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 17, 2014, at 19. 
Compare STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK (2010), with ANTONIN SCALIA 
& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW (2012). 
 126. Obama apparently believes that judges should not be agents of social change. 
Goldman et al., supra note 17, at 18; Tobias, supra note 12, at 2249; Toobin, supra note 85, 
at 26. 
 127. Russell Wheeler, How Might the Obama Administration Affect the Composition of the 
U. S. Courts of Appeals?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu
/research/opinions/2009/03/18-courts-wheeler [http://perma.cc/M3JW-JQX9]; supra text 
accompanying notes 16–19. Thus, his elections were ostensibly mandates for balance. Tobias, 
supra note 12, at 2249. 
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Certain facets merit enhancement. One was alacrity: D.C. Circuit nominations and 
confirmations proved tardy. Obama is the sole President since the mid-1970s who 
mustered no first-term appointment.128 To the extent processes were long, he bears 
minimal responsibility. Some ideas can explain delayed nomination. Obama 
appeared cautious about tapping D.C. Circuit possibilities, lest review devour months 
and slow numerous others, concerns that Halligan’s mixed assessment justified. 
Principal responsibility for dilatory consideration is fairly assigned to Republicans. 
They systematically compelled Democrats to apply cloture petitions, notably on all 
the D.C. Circuit selections,129 and requested much debate time, yet consumed little, 
and roll call votes for numbers of easily approved candidates.130 Phenomena, 
including the dire recession, which Obama and Congress had limited ability to 
control, may explicate protracted activity, but GOP recalcitrance, seemingly 
animated mainly by payback and D.C. Circuit ideological balance, appears to best 
explain the situation.131  
Mandating that superior nominees wait prolonged times places careers on hold 
and dissuades respected lawyers from contemplating the bench.132 Long waits 
deprive tribunals of judicial resources they need and erode swift, inexpensive, and 
equitable case disposition and regard for both confirmation procedures and the 
coequal branches. Assimilating D.C. Circuit and High Court appointments imposes 
these deleterious consequences and more.133  
C. Summary 
Obama sent five very qualified D.C. Circuit nominees. However, the GOP lacked 
an evidentiary basis for making Halligan wait two years on a vote and delaying three 
recent nominees.134 Why Halligan deserved complete processing and lawmakers 
should have better treated subsequent nominees, accordingly, warrants closer 
inquiry. Article II, venerable conventions, and lengthy practice suggest capable, 
uncontroversial prospects (and even talented, contested, mainstream nominees who 
may supplement ideological balance) require thorough, efficient investigations and 
comprehensive debates with affirmative or negative chamber ballots. Those are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. He had fewer 2009 confirmees than four predecessors but improved later. See Tobias, 
supra note 12, at 2246; Peters, supra note 16. 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 26, 64, 77, 96, 111, 119; infra text accompanying 
notes 152, 156.  
 130. They slowly agreed to votes and debates on reported picks. See supra text 
accompanying notes 26–27.  
 131. Rapidly filling Supreme Court seats was critical, ending other work. See Goldman et 
al., supra note 17, at 10. Obama had to form a government and face complex problems, notably 
two wars. Tobias, supra note 12, at 2253–54. 
 132. It can stop lawyers from taking cases that may prove controversial and subvert 
candidacies on both ends of the ideological spectrum. Tobias, supra note 12, at 2253; see 159 
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fundamental precepts that both caucuses endorse.135 Republicans should have 
permitted speedy action in which legislators could assiduously explore the merits of 
nominees’ candidacies and quickly vote, because Democrats honored many pressing 
requests to canvass Halligan and Srinivasan in the pragmatic spirit of consensus and 
helped confirm four people whom Bush sponsored.136  
These propositions explain why all five Obama nominees had substantial, careful 
analysis of competence in the panel phase. Article II envisions lawmakers will 
cautiously scrutinize picks’ abilities, character, and temperament but must 
deemphasize ideology that enjoys little salience for whether centrist nominees in fact 
possess those attributes.137 To the extent senators might have premised any of these 
nominees’ rejection or delay on concerns about how they would conclude appeals, 
legislators should jettison this construct, which may undermine judicial 
independence.138 The GOP ought to have eschewed additional filibusters with the 
recent nominees, because fine moderate possibilities deserve floor ballots, unless 
incisive review elicits numerous severe complications that ineluctably disqualify the 
excellent prospects.139  
 In sum, this examination reveals Millett, Pillard, and Wilkins comprised stellar 
nominees who have mainstream ideological perspectives and who did not satisfy 
extraordinary circumstances, as Republicans believed Halligan would.140 It 
demonstrates the D.C. Circuit must have eleven jurists to address filings, a position 
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the Judicial Conference recently affirmed.141 Therefore, senators properly calibrated 
filibusters which allowed three nominees cloture and final votes. 
III. CONSEQUENCES 
Supplying Millett, Pillard, and Wilkins yes or no ballots furnished critical specific 
advantages. Permitting votes meant the individuals garnered Senate confirmation and 
the court actually experienced a whole contingent for the first time in several 
decades,142 which provided the circuit sufficient resources to promptly, 
economically, and fairly decide cases.143 Appointing the remarkable, diverse jurists 
should improve understanding and resolution of crucial questions; curtail ethnic, 
gender, and corresponding prejudices that impair justice; and enlarge confidence in 
the bench.144 The selections approved could also expand D.C. Circuit ideological 
equilibrium, but they will alter comparatively few appeals’ disposition.145  
Related persuasive justifications supported granting the three choices floor 
ballots. Because neither the President’s well-qualified, moderate nominees nor 
concerns about caseload—an idea substantiated by the Judicial Conference 
recommendation that the appellate court warrants all the jurists—meets 
extraordinary circumstances, the nominees merit yes or no votes.146 White Houses 
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may concomitantly evaluate designees’ ostensible ideological views, especially to 
remedy or ameliorate chronic lack of balance, particularly at the D.C. Circuit.147 
Ideology simply does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance.148 Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist’s decisive admonishment rings true: The “‘right way [for 
making] a popular imprint on’” the courts should be when the elected “‘President 
and the Senate have felt free to [consider nominees’] likely judicial philosophy.’”149 
Moreover, dogged GOP unwillingness to allow final ballots on three impressive 
centrist picks essentially nullified the will of the voters expressed in electing 
President Obama twice.150  
Deployment of fifty-one, rather than sixty-seven, votes when amending filibusters 
to permit a majority ballot for cloture had some detrimental ramifications.151 The 
nuclear option drastically worsened the fractious Republican-Democratic 
appointments relationship which governed a plethora of courts. Activating this 
mechanism critically accelerated the downward spiral, witnessed by three 
candidates’ narrow approval margins, insistence that every subsequent pick secure 
cloture, the acute paucity of confirmations the next several months, the fifty-three 
present trial level openings, and the robust GOP dependence on technicalities when 
stalling nominees.152 In fairness, the parties currently share responsibility for the 
pernicious appointments conundrum, as each capitalized on innovative devices that 
subverted the procedures.153 For example, when the GOP implacably refused any of 
three sterling mainstream choices floor votes, Democrats perceived they had 
exhausted viable alternatives, which sparked the nuclear option’s ignition.154 
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Republicans correspondingly proclaimed that detonation eliminated all the chamber 
rules and might jeopardize the Senate institutionally,155 while the GOP consistently 
abused prenomination customs—namely swiftly proffering able candidates, blue slip 
practices, and multiple other conventions, such as unanimous consent—to block 
possibilities’ nomination and confirmation.156 
IV. SUGGESTIONS 
During the short term, few pertinent endeavors respecting appointments can be 
implemented, as the D.C. Circuit has an entire complement and, thus, currently lacks 
vacancies. The Judiciary Committee, under the Bankruptcy and the Courts 
Subcommittee’s auspices, will perhaps further investigate the vigorously disputed 
question of whether the circuit needs every jurist, and it could assemble, canvass, 
and synthesize relevant empirical information on caseloads and workloads. 
However, this would duplicate responsibilities that the conference has efficaciously 
discharged for years when it affords Congress judgeship recommendations by 
aggregating conservative docket and workload projections that reflect empirical 
data.157 Indeed, the subcommittee conducted a late 2013 hearing at which the chair 
of the applicable conference panel explicated the analytical methodology that 
underlay its finding that the court requires eleven jurists.158  
Nevertheless, this appellate concept may yield less nuanced information than the 
analogous district court approach, which assigns rather precise weights to specific 
cases, so the conference probably should attempt to extract relatively precise 
conclusions from systematically accumulated data.159 Now that Grassley has become 
the Judiciary Chair, he might pursue greater information or seek adoption of the 
Court Efficiency Act.160 Republicans and Democrats can revisit the ample 
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controversy about the D.C. Circuit by ascertaining whether collection of additional 
material would permit comparatively sophisticated determinations and, if true, 
whether the refinements demonstrate the judicial contingent’s number warrants 
adjustment.  
Over the longer term, the parties should craft relatively permanent, effective 
solutions for vexing problems that attend selection. Of course, were partisanship and 
ideology to continue driving appointments, the complications may essentially be 
intractable. Notwithstanding whose representations are correct, so long as each 
participates in the counterproductive dynamics while staunchly regarding any 
concession to be unilateral disarmament, limited progress will occur.  
Therefore, Republicans and Democrats should explore promising remedies. First, 
they might deftly restore numerous customs which dominated as recently as Bush’s 
tenure. Democrats may seriously ponder reinstating the sixty votes that were 
necessary for cloture, if the GOP agrees to up or down ballots respecting talented 
moderate district nominees.161 Both parties should concomitantly think about 
carefully resurrecting the Gang of 14 and defining with enhanced particularity its 
extraordinary circumstances metric.162  
Rather dramatic avenues can also be reviewed. For instance, Democrats could 
enable Republicans to designate someone who fills the next Obama administration 
D.C. Circuit vacant post or alternate future candidates, thus inaugurating a bipartisan 
submission process.163 Republicans and Democrats might correspondingly examine 
ways to sharply restrict the disadvantages which rampant partisanship and singular 
concern about ideology directly provoke. For example, no reasons compel assigning 
the D.C. Circuit abundant jurisdiction over contentious and delicate issues regarding 
military commissions, terrorism, and certain agency decisions.164 A nonpartisan, 
multibranch expert group can rigorously study the difficulties that plague 
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confirmations while articulating a number of constructive suggestions which the 
2017 President and Senate could in turn evaluate.165 
CONCLUSION 
President Obama recently appointed three strong centrist aspirants to the D.C. 
Circuit: Patricia Millett, Cornelia Pillard, and Robert Wilkins. Because no designee 
invoked extraordinary circumstances, they received minimal substantive debate with 
positive or negative committee approval votes. When Republicans continually 
delayed all individuals’ final ballots, the majority released the nuclear option which 
yielded confirmations. The Senate appropriately chose to vote on Millett, Pillard, and 
Wilkins. Nonetheless, unleashing this crucial weapon has further exacerbated 
severely dysfunctional appointments relations. Therefore, the parties must consider 
ways to arrest the deterioration which infects selection for the D.C. Circuit and other 
courts and erodes justice over the 114th Congress now that the GOP possesses a 
Senate majority and has confirmed a minuscule number of judges this year. 
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